In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that teams behave equivalently to individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that teams and individuals are behaviorally equivalent in Cournot oligopoly providing a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, contrasting analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature. JEL-Classifications: C72, C91, C92, D21, D23, D43, L13, L22, M52.
Introduction
In the economic literature on market competition such as Bertrand or Cournot competition, firms are modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected. This is known as the unitary player assumption. More recent studies of the theory of the firm (e.g. Hart, 1995) and personnel economics (e.g. Lazear, 1995 , Prendergast, 1999 ) focused extensively on the international organization of the firm. However, this could not decrease the prominence of Bertrand and Cournot models in economic research and teaching.
In quantity competition a là Cournot, teams do not generally display the same behavior as individuals. Strategic delegation of a principal to a manager in Cournot oligopoly leads to revenue maximization of the firm rather than profit maximization (see Vickers, 1985, Fershtman and Judd, 1987) . This example shows that the behavior of the firm depends crucially on the model of interaction within the team/firm. Thus from a theoretical point of view, the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition must be questioned. However, there exist models of firm organization generating behavior equivalent to a single decision maker providing a theoretical foundation of the unitary player assumption in the Cournot oligopoly. For example, we consider a Cournot oligopoly where members of each firm choose efforts. For simplicity, the efforts of the members in each firm are aggregated additively to the quantity of the firm (see also Nabantian and Schotter, 1997). We consider two different regimes of distributing the firm's profits among its members. First, profits may be distributed equally per head, an arrangement that may correspond loosely to a co-operative like a Kibbutz. Second, profits may be distributed proportionally according to the member's effort and each member's effort is costly. In both cases the Nash equilibrium quantities of the firms are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium in an analog Cournot oligopoly in which each firm is a single decision maker. The question is whether there is also empirical evidence for such behavioral equivalence. We study experimentally this behavioral equivalence and find support for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition.
Our work is in direct contrast to recent experimental results on price competition between teams. and Bornstein, Budescu, and Kugler (2002) test the unitary player assumption in Bertrand duopoly. In these studies, the organizations of the firms are analog to ours. However, instead the aggregation of efforts to quantities, individual prices are aggregated additively to the firm's price. They reject the unitary player assumption in price competition between teams.
An early experimental study investigating quantity competition between firms consisting each of a group of subjects is Sauermann and Selten (1959) . In this study, the internal structure of the firm is rather complex aiming at replicating a "realistic" decision environment. In contrast, we want to have more control over the internal organization of the firm, i.e., the aggregation of decisions and the the distribution of profits. The design of our experiment is related to experiments on Cournot competition, in particular with regard to the number of firms, the time horizon, the feedback information between rounds, the fixed matching scheme, and the computational support available to subjects Our study relates to the growing literature studying comparatively decisions taken by teams versus decisions taken by individuals. Nabantian and Schotter (1997) examine the influence of different incentive schemes on team production, among them also the distribution of profits per head as well as proportional distribution. As in our design, they aggregate decisions of subjects inside the firm additively. However, their study is restricted to a monopoly. Bornstein and Erev (1994) The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces in detail the experimental design. The hypothesis are presented in section 3. All results are contained in section 4. We conclude with a discussion in section 5. The instructions to the subjects are contained in the appendix.
Design
Our model of market competition is a symmetric 3-firm Cournot oligopoly 1 with linear demand and costs. Every firm faces the inverse demand function
whereby Q = 3 j=1 q j is the sum of all firm's quantities q j ∈ R, j = 1, ..., 3. Each firm has unit marginal costs, i.e. c(q j ) = q j . The profit function of each firm j = 1, 2, 3 is given by
whereby q −j = k =j q k is the sum of quantities of firm j's opponents.
Let F j be the set of members of firm j. Each firm j = 1, 2, 3 is viewed as a team of members i j ∈ F j choosing effort levels e i j . For all treatments, q j = i j ∈F j e i j . That is, the quantity of each firm is the sum of its members' efforts. The four treatments 1 Three firms are chosen rather than two in order to avoid possible problems of collusion due to number effects (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004) . differ in their model of the internal organization of the firm. In particular the incentive structure varies across treatments. However, parameters were chosen such that there is a behavioral equivalence between firms and single decision makers.
Treatment C
Treatment C is a (C)ontrol-treatment with a standard 3-firm symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Each firm corresponds to a single member such that each member's effort corresponds to a firm's quantity. The payoff function of each subject is simply the profit function of his firm (equation (2)).
Treatment SP
Treatment SP is a treatment with (S)ymmetric firm-size and (P)roportional incentives.
Each firm has three members, i.e., F j = {1 j , 2 j , 3 j }, for all firms j = 1, 2, 3. Every member faces identical linear costs of efforts k(e i j ) = 83 1 6 e j i , that are chosen such to yield a behavioral equivalence between individual and firm behavior (see below). Moreover, every member is entitled to a share of his firm's profit that is proportional to his effort level. That is, the payoff function of each member i j = 1 j , 2 j , 3 j is
Note that treatment SP is equivalent to a standard nine-firm Cournot Oligopoly with marginal cost k+c. In this sense, the treatment allows us also to test whether the framing of three players each as a firm influences behavior.
Treatment SH
Treatment SH is a treatment with (S)ymmetric firm-size and an allocation of profits per (H)ead. The treatment is analog to treatment SP except for the distribution of firmprofits and effort costs. Effort costs k(e i j ) = 0 are nil, such that we obtain a behavioral equivalence between individuals and firms (see below). For each firm j = 1, 2, 3, the payoff function of each member i j = 1 j , 2 j , 3 j is
That is, profits of the firm are allocated per head and independent of the member's effort.
Note that in this treatment (as well as in treatment AH below) any distribution of the Cournot Nash quantities among members of a firm is a Nash equilibrium. Thus this treatment allows us to investigate how members of a firm face a intra-firm coordination problem. In comparison with treatment SP, we can evaluate the effect of two different rules of profit distribution among members of a firm.
Treatment AH
Treatment AH is a treatment with (A)symmetric firm-size and an allocation of profits per (H)ead. The treatment is analog to treatment SH except for the sizes of the firms.
Firm 1 consists just of a single member, whose effort corresponds to the quantity of firm 1. Firm 2 and 3 have three members each as in the treatments before. Consequently, the payoff functions for each member differ depending on whether the member is in firm 1 or in the other two firms. Based on previous Cournot experiments in the literature, the game in each of our treatments was played repeatedly for 40 rounds with fixed matching in order to enable subjects to learn. Each subject had to choose his effort level from the grid {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., x}, whereby x was fixed at 1500 in treatment SP, SH and AH (for subjects in three-member firms) and at 4500 in treatment C and AH (for subjects in single-member firms). The grid was chosen such to make all prominent outcomes feasible and allow also for the monopoly outcome. Between the rounds, each subject received feedback information on his own effort and profit, the total effort of all members in his firm (only treatment SP, SH, and for team-firms in treatment AH) and the total quantity of all other firms in the previous period. Note that this information is sufficient for myopic best-reply learning.
Each session consisted of three stages: the briefing stage, the interaction-stage, and the debriefing stage. Stages 2 and 3 were programmed in the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999 ). In the briefing stage, subjects received written instructions that were read aloud by the experimenter. In the appendix we include as an example an English translation of the instructions for treatment SP, which we consider the most complex instruction among all treatments. The instructions describe the game as well as the details of the session. The game was indeed framed as competition among firms as presented in this article. The demand function, costs functions, effort costs, profit-distribution and teamsizes were public knowledge. Moreover, all subjects knew what feedback they would receive after each round. The appendix provides an example of a screen-shoot. Such example was also presented and explained to subjects in the instructions. Subjects were encouraged to ask questions about the instructions, which some did. Answers were given to all. After the instructions, an example was computed in front of the subjects by the experimenter to enhance the subjects' understanding of the incentives. After that, each subject had to take a simple test that required the calculation of firm-profits and member-payoffs. 2 Subjects had a standard calculator available. Only after all subjects successfully completed the test, the interaction-stage was started. The exchange rate from the experimental currency Taler to EURO was announced in the instructions. It varied between 250000 to 25000 Taler per Euro depending on treatment and type of firm.
Moreover, since losses are possible, each subject received a lumpsum payment of 60000 (only treatment SH) or 3000 Taler (all treatments except SH) upfront, which was also announced in the instructions.
In the interaction stage, subjects had to play the game repeatedly for 40 rounds. To support their decision, they had three different "trail"-calculators available (see screenshoot in the appendix). It was understood from the instructions that the inputs in those calculations have no influence on their payoff from the experiment. First, there was a calculator (2a) that automatically computed the member's payoff if he inserted a number each for his own effort, the total effort by other members of the team and the total quantity of opponent-firms (the "trail calculator"). 3 Second, there was a calculator (2b) that automatically computed the member's best response and profit if he inserted a number each for the total effort by other members of the team and the total quantity of opponent-firms (the "best-reply calculator"). Subjects could try out as much as they wanted and the computed payoffs were listed below the calculators respectively. Those lists were automatically deleted after each round. However, all entries to the calculators have been recorded by the experimenter automatically. Third, there was a standard calculator on the computer available. After all subjects in the session had chosen and confirmed their effort levels, payoffs were computed automatically and the the next round was started. After each round subjects received feedback information (see above), which was displayed at the top of the next period's screen.
The debriefing stage consisted of a computerized questionnaire that asked for the following information: major, term, gender, whether the subject participated in a lecture on game theory, and how the participant would summarize his behavior. At the end of evidence that subjects started out with the values of the example.
the questionnaire the final payoff converted in EURO was announced to the subject. The exchange rates were announced previously in the instructions. Final payoffs were paid immediately after the session concluded.
Beside the obvious treatment variables discussed above, there are other variables that could influence the experimental outcome, but which we fixed throughout the experiment.
For instance, we do not study the influence of information on the behavior of firms. We are aware that different information may lead to different learning behavior and outcomes (see for example Oechssler, 1999, 2000) . Since we do not want to study how subjects master the degree of computational complexity involved in playing optimally, we provided them with the three different calculators discussed above. We also decided to use the framing as "firms", "market" etc. since it is standard in the literature on Cournot experiments (see Huck, 2002 ).
Finally, we need to mention that losses were possible. Thus subjects could possibly get bankrupt even with the initial lumpsum payment upfront. Indeed, this occurred in a few cases in the early rounds of the experiment in treatment SP. In such cases we bilaterally agreed with those subjects a loan such that they could continue with the experiment.
Hypotheses
This article is to test the unitary player assumption in the Cournot oligopoly. Our design allows us to test following hypotheses. Note that each market is an independent observation.
Hypothesis 1 Total output of markets do not differ significantly across treatments.
Hypothesis 2 Total output of markets do not differ significantly from total Cournot
Nash equilibrium output. Above hypothesis concern the average behavior in the experiment. We do not expect that subjects choose exact equilibrium efforts over all 40 periods. Rather, our design allows subjects to learn using (sequential) best-reply process. Indeed, since the game in each treatment has a potential function 4 , one can show that sequential myopic best-reply converges to the Nash equilibrium in finite time (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
Hypothesis 5 Individual efforts, firms' quantities and market quantities converge to Nash equilibrium levels.
Apart from above hypotheses we would like to analyze following issues. First, how is the co-ordination problem in treatments SH and AH reflected in the data? Do subjects manage to select an equilibrium or are they unable to co-ordinate in one of them? Second, our design allows subjects to follow a (sequential) best-reply process converging to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. We would like to check whether this is indeed the case.
Third, we would like relate the inputs into the calculators to the individual quantities.
Do subjects choose an effort that they calculated beforehand. Are subjects' "beliefs" about opponents correct in the sense that opponents behave as assumed in their previous calculations? Do subjects search for best or better replies?
Results
The experiment has been conducted in the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics in May 2003. For each treatment we generated 6 independent observations. In total 168 subjects participated in our experiments. According to answers to the questionnaire at the end of the experiment, about 58% of the subjects majored in economics, 23% in law, 5% in languages and the rest in history, communication, political science etc. About 62% of the subjects were undergraduates (6 semesters maximum). 16% of the subjects where above the 8th semester. The sex ratio was almost balanced with about 49% female subjects. About 19% of the subjects announced that they had previously discussed game theory in a course. We could not find any focal correlation between the results and the subject's characteristics
Each session took about 2 to 2 1 2 hours including briefing and debriefing. The payoff to each student was about 18 Euro in the average. with the ones of C we cannot reject a behavioral equivalence even at 10% significance levels.
Market Quantities
The Nash equilibrium prediction is confirmed by a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
One-Sample Test (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988) . 6 Rejection of the nil-hypothesis was 5 The two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whtiney Test indicates whether samples from two populations have the same distribution without presupposing the direction of eventual differences. In contrast, the Robust Rank-Order Test is concerned with the means of those two samples without assuming that they are sampled from the same distribution. Note that 0.1 the highest significance level in Siegel and Castellan (1988) for this test.
not possible even at the 0.2 significance level.
So far, the observations of market quantities are summarized as follows:
Observation 1 Total output of markets do not differ significantly across treatments C, SP, and SH. I.e., for these treatments we can not reject Hypothesis 1. For treatment AH significance levels are lower than in treatment SH and SH.
Observation 2 Total output of markets do not differ significantly from the total Cournot Nash equilibrium output. I.e., we can not reject Hypothesis 2.
From Table 2 we know that standard errors in treatment SH and AH are higher than in treatment SP and C. Indeed, judging by the Figures 1 and 2 , the volatility seems to be higher in treatment SH and AH than in SP and C. This is probably due to the coordination problem subjects faced within each firm in those treatments. Recall that there are many individual Nash equilibrium efforts all adding to the firm's Nash equilibrium quantity. In treatments SH and AH the standard errors of the firm quantities and individual efforts are higher than in treatments SP and C (Table 3) and AH (about 30% for individual firms and over 20% for team firms).
Individuals and Firms

Observation 6
The standard errors of firms' quantities and individuals' efforts are higher in treatments SH and AH than in treatments SP and C, which is probably due to the co-ordination problem. The standard errors in those treatments do not decrease in the last 20 periods of the experiment for a substantial proportion of individuals and firms.
Our data on individual efforts/quantities suggest some behavioral heterogeniety among subjects. A way of capturing this heterogeniety is by constructing different types of sub- jects. We distinguish between aggressive and defensive subjects and firms. We say a subject (firm) is aggressive if 60% of the periods it plays at least 50 (100) grid-points above the Nash equilibrium level. Similarly, a subject (firm) is defensive if 60% of the periods it plays at last 50 (100) grid-points below the Nash equilibrium level. Table 4 reveals the distribution of types across treatments. For individual efforts, treatment SH and AH has a higher percentage of extreme types compared to SP. Note that in those treatments there were also asymmetric equilibria involving asymmetric levels of efforts across individuals within the same firm. Similarly, treatment SH has more extreme firms compared to SP, AH, and C. There is not much difference among latter three treatments in terms of distribution of types of firms. Remarkably, the percentage of defensive and aggressive type of firms is almost equal in each treatment.
Observation 7 Treatments SH and AH lead to more asymmetry among individual effort levels as compared to treatment SP. This is in line with the existence of asymmetric Nash equilibria in treatments SH and AH.
Convergence and Learning
We say that a time series of a variable converges to the Nash equilibrium level if in the last 20 rounds a higher percentage of cases is within a range of +/ − δ around the Nash equilibrium level than in the first 20 rounds. We fix δ at 30, 80, and 100 grid-points for individual efforts, firm quantities and market quantities respectively. Table 5 shows the percentage of cases which do converge to the Nash equilibrium level.
There is indeed some support for convergence but our notion of convergence is rather weak. That's why we also report in Table 6 According to Hypothesis 5, individual efforts, firm quantities and market quantities should converge to the Nash equilibrium levels in all treatments. Indeed, our design allowed subjects to learn the respective equilibrium levels using a myopic sequential best-reply process. However, there is only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning across treatment. Figure 3 shows the mean square deviation between the each subject's best-reply and the actual effort choices per period per treatment. Although the mean square deviation declines over 40 periods, it is still substantial at the end of the 40 rounds. Observation 8 There is only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning and convergence to Nash equilibrium levels.
Calulator Data
One feature of our experimental design is the collection of data calculated by subjects. In 50% to 70% and seems to fall below 50% (in treatment SH even to about 20%). We do indicates that only about half of the subjects used their calculations for checking the result of the previous period. Thus it is unlikely that they consciously used some myopic best-response adjustment process. Finally, the lower right graph shows that only a small fraction of individuals used at least one variable that also appeared in the subsequent period. This fraction does not increase over the 40 periods. If we assume that subjects try out what they believe opponents will do, then the graph indicates that subjects were unable to correctly anticipate the decisions of others and did not learn to anticipate other's decisions.
The time for making decisions per period decreased from about 200 seconds at the beginning over about 50 seconds after the 10. period to about 30 seconds at the end.
Almost across all periods these decision times were slightly higher in treatment SH and 
A Translation of Instructions Treatment SP
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money by making decisions. Your earnings will depend on your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants. Please read the instructions carefully. All participants received the same instructions. From now on please do not talk to other participants anymore. For any questions please do not hesitate to contact us.
You will draw shortly a random number. With this number you will remain anonymous for us and other participants during the experiment. Please proceed to the cabin in the laboratory with the same number.
Firms
When arriving at your cabin, you will be matched automatically and randomly with other participants into a firm without knowing the other participants. In every firm there are 3 members (except you there are two other members in your firm). Each market consist of 3 firms (except your firm there are two other firms in your market). The experiment consists of 40 periods which are followed by a questionnaire. The matching of the participants in firms remains the same throughout the 40 periods. Moreover, there are always the same firms in a market. In each period each firm sells a quantity in the market. The costs to the firm are 1 Taler per quantity. The price per quantity depends on your firm quantity as well as the quantities of the other two firms in your market. The higher the quantities in the market, the lower the price. The lowest possible price is nil. The price function is price per quantity = 500 − 1 6 × total quantity of all firms in the market or 0
The profit per quantity is the profit of the firm per quantity. It is calculated as follows:
profit per quantity = price per quantity − firm costs per quantity
The profit of the firm per period is simply the profit per quantity multiplied with the quantity of the firm:
profit of the firm = profit per quantity × quantity of the firm
Your decision
In each period each participant has to take a decision about his effort spent in the firm. The effort can lie between 0 and 1250 (in steps to 0.1). The costs to each participant per effort is 83
Taler. The sum of all efforts over all participants within a firm is the quantity of the firm, which the firm sells in the market. quantity of the firm = sum of efforts of all members within the firm Each member of a firm receives a share on the profit of the firm. This share is calculated as follows:
share on firm profit = own effort sum of efforts of all members × firm profit
The costs of effort is calculated from the costs per effort of 83 The calculator to the right side (2b) calculates your optimal own effort (e * ) and your optimal payoff (g * ) if you input your belief about the efforts of the other members of the your firm (a) as well as your belief about the quantities of the other firms (A). The optimal own effort (e * ) is the effort which maximizes your payoff in this period if the other members of your firm and the other firms behave as input by you. Your calculations are listed under the calculator after you press the "calculate" button with the mouse. At the right side below the calculator there is also a button. If you press this button a standard calculator appears on your screen.
(3) Your decision
In (3) you have to choose your effort level. In contrast to the calculators, this input will influence your payoff as outlined above. Only after you pressed "OK", your decision will be confirmed and the experiments proceeds with the next period. After 40 periods a questionnaire appears at the screen, which we ask you kindly to fill in.
Your final payoff
Since in this experiment there can be losses in a period, you will receive at the beginning an initial balance of 60 000 Taler. For your final payoff we calculate the sum of your initial balance plus the sum of payoffs of all periods. This payoff in Taler will be exchanged into EURO using an exchange rate of 700 Taler = 1 Cent. This will be paid to you immediately after the experiment.
